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Feature Comment: tempering ‘Buy 
american’ In the recovery act—
Steering Clear of a trade War






menting Guidance for the American Recovery and 





law,	 all	 iron,	 steel	 and	manufactured	 goods	 be	
produced	in	the	U.S.	The	regulation	implement-
ing	§	1605	may	be	published	as	an	interim	rule	
and,	 presumably,	 become	 binding	 immediately	










rity,	Not	Protectionism,”	in The Collapse of Global 
Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recom-
mendations for the G20,	 at	 87	 (Richard	Baldwin	






The	 timing	 could	 not	 be	more	 delicate.	This	
rulemaking	comes	just	before	the	April	2009	G-20	
summit,	when	the	U.S.	will	attempt	to	persuade	its	

























tional	agreements.”	See,	e.g., Congressional Record, 
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International Support for Open Markets ...:	





















could	 create	 a	 downward	 spiral	 like	 the	world	 ex-
perienced	 in	 the	1930s.”	See Congressional Record,	
Feb.	4,	2009,	at	S1529	(quoted	by	Sen.	John	McCain	
(R-Ariz.)).





















Increased Pressure on Nations Outside the “Walled 
Garden” of U.S. Procurement:	The	U.S.	takes	a	special	
approach	to	its	free	trade	agreements	in	procurement,	
in	which	 reciprocity,	 rather	 than	 openness,	 serves	
as	the	ultimate	touchstone.	To	encourage	other	na-
tions	to	join	agreements,	the	U.S.	generally	excludes 
from	 the	 federal	market	 those	 nations	 that	 have	






moving	 to	 join	 the	WTO	Government	Procurement	
Agreement	(GPA),	and	India,	which	is	not—alarmed	
by	 their	 exclusion	 from	 the	hundreds	 of	 billions	 of	
dollars	 funded	by	 the	Recovery	Act,	may	 sense	 an	
increased	level	of	urgency	to	enter	into	U.S.	free	trade	
arrangements.













The Perils of Rulemaking: Domestic and 
Global Political Contexts—The	 procurement	
regulators	 face	 a	 checkered	political	 landscape,	 for	
the	Obama	 administration	 earlier	may	have	 sent	
mixed	messages.	On	 the	 campaign	 trail,	 candidate	
Obama	bemoaned	 the	 (since-overturned)	 award	 of	
the	Air	Force	 tanker	 contract	 to	 a	 team	 including	
EADS	over	Boeing,	and	implied	it	was	hard	for	him	
to	believe	that	“an	American	company	that	has	been	
a	 traditional	 source	 of	 aeronautic	 excellence”	was	




















crisis	 cannot	 start	 turning	 inward	and	 try	 to	 erect	
protectionist	 barriers.	We	 should	 encourage	 trade.”	
Remarks by President Obama and British Prime 
Minister After Meeting,	March	3,	2009,	available	at 
www.whitehouse.gov.
The Administration’s Procurement Agen-
da—True	to	these	concerns,	the	Obama	administra-
tion	has	not pressed	 for	 protectionism,	 as	 the	new	
administration	 has	 taken	 its	 first	 steps	 towards	
procurement	 reform.	The	 new	 administration	 has	
instead	stressed:
Containing Procurement Costs:	The	Recovery	Act	
and	 other	 economic	 stimulus	measures	will	 likely	
drive	 the	U.S.	 budget	 deeper	 into	 deficit	 spending	
and	mind-boggling	 debts	 for	many	 years.	To	 stem	
that	tide,	the	Obama	administration	intends	to	probe	
expensive	weapon	 system	 programs	 for	 possible	













Office,	GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: 
Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital 
Program Costs,	 (GAO-09-3SP)	 (assessment	 tool	 for	
program	costs),	available	at www.gao.gov.










lation	 of	 cost-reimbursement	 contracts.	We	 remain	
skeptical	of	these	priorities	(although	we	acknowledge	
that	they	resonate	with	the	media).
Rebuilding the Acquisition Workforce:	After	
years	of	denial,	 the	Federal	Government	 is	finally	
awakening	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 its	 acquisition	work-
force	 desperately	 needs	 to	 be	 bolstered.	 See,	 e.g., 
“Acquisition	Workload	 and	 Ineffective	Oversight	
Remain	Top	Concerns,	 PSC	Finds,”	 50	GC	¶	 433;	
Professional	Services	Council,	Acquisition in Tran-
sition: Workforce, Oversight and Mission	 (October	
2008)	 (“As	…	 in	 all	 previous	 surveys,	 workforce	
issues	were	 the	 number	 one	 challenge	 and	 area	
of	 focus”),	 available	 at	www.pscouncil.org/pdfs/
2008PSCProcurementPolicySurvey.pdf;	Commission	
on	Army	Acquisition	and	Program	Management	in	
Expeditionary	Operations,	Urgent Reform Required: 
Army Expeditionary Contracting	 (Oct.	 31,	 2007),	
available	 at	www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Com-
mission_Report_Final_071031.pdf.	The	presidential	
memo	called	 for	OMB	to	 issue	guidance	 to	“assist	
agencies	in	assessing	the	capacity	and	ability	of	the	
Federal	 acquisition	workforce.”	Of	 course,	 that	 is	
not	a	complete	solution,	but	we	hope	that	it	at	least	
signals	a	step	in	the	right	direction.
Checking Federal Outsourcing: Finally,	the	presi-
dential	memo	 called	 for	 guidance	 to	“clarify	when	
governmental	outsourcing	for	services	is	and	is	not	
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Thus,	 although	 the	 president	 has	 publicly	
charted	an	ambitious	course	for	procurement	reform,	




































sions.	 It	 assured	members,	 however,	 that	 the	
controversial	 provisions	will	 be	 implemented	
“fairly”—in	consonance	with	 its	commitments.	










4,	 2009,	 at	 21.	The	 challenge	 for	U.S.	 regulators,	
therefore,	 is	to	 implement	§	1605’s	“Buy	American”	
requirements	without	driving	 the	 globe	 closer	 to	 a	
trade	war.
Potential Ways Forward for U.S. Regula-
tors—The	 regulatory	drafters	must	 start	with	 the	
relatively	 spare	 language	 of	 statute	 itself.	 Section	
1605	of	the	Recovery	Act	reads:
BUY	AMERICAN






















	 (c)	 If	 the	head	 of	 a	Federal	 department	 or	
agency	determines	that	it	is	necessary	to	waive	









•	 Articulated	a	default	 rule	 that	all	“iron,	steel,	
and	manufactured	 goods”	 used	 in	 a	 “public	
building”	or	“public	work”	funded	by	the	Recov-
ery	Act	must	be	produced	in	the	U.S.















•	 Left	 agency	 heads	 the	 option	 of	waiving	 the	
requirement	 for	 reasons	 of	 public	 interest,	 or	
a	defined	measure	of	excessive	cost,	 i.e.,	 if	the	
overall	 cost	 of	 the	 project	would	 increase	 by	
more	than	25	percent.








iron,	 steel	 and	manufactured	 goods,	 except	 in	
certain	 instances.	 Section	 1605(d)	 is	 not	 in-
tended	to	repeal	by	implication	the	President’s	
authority	 under	Title	 III	 of	 the	Trade	Agree-
ments	Act	of	1979.	The	conferees	anticipate	that	















The	 conference	 report	 thus	 reflects	 the	 conferees’	
understanding	 that	 the	U.S.	would	honor	 its	 trade	
agreements,	and	that	least-developed	nations	should	
continue	 to	 be	 afforded	 special	 admission	 to	 the	
“walled	garden”	of	U.S.	procurement,	but	offered	little	
further	 guidance.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 relatively	 sparse	
legislative	 record,	 there	are	 several	 potential	ways	
forward	for	the	U.S.	regulators.




tory	 structure	 in	 FAR	 pt.	 25.	The	 FAR	 describes	









The	 existing	 structure	 in	FAR	pt.	 25	 provides	
a	 pragmatic	 solution,	 for	FAR	pt.	 25	 both	permits 
and	 excludes	 foreign	 vendors.	 For	 procurements	
over	 certain	monetary	 thresholds,	 FAR	pt.	 25	 ac-
commodates	 vendors	 from	nations	with	 standing	
open-market	agreements	with	the	U.S.	But	FAR	pt.	
25	 also	 acknowledges	 that	 those	 larger	 purchases	
may	not go	to	vendors	from	nations	that	do	not	have	
trade	 agreements	with	 the	U.S.	 (or	 are	 not	 least-	
developed	nations).	Thus,	FAR	pt.	25	already	excludes	
nations	without	 open-market	 agreements	with	 the	
U.S.,	such	as	China,	and	creates	a	(so-called)	“walled	
garden”	 for	 vendors	 from	 the	U.S.	 and	 from	 na-
tions	with	open-market	agreements.	Of	course,	this	
means	that	the	central	goal	of	the	Recovery	Act’s	§	





would	 the	 new	 law’s	 domestic	 preferences	 in	 fact	
mean	anything?	The	answer	 is	yes,	but	the	change	
would	be	marginal.	For	example,	although	the	“Buy	
American”	 provisions	 generally	would	 not	 create	
new	constraints	for	federal	agencies	that	are	already	
bound	by	existing	trade	agreements,	the	Recovery	Act	
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This	 “short	 and	 simple”	 regulatory	 approach	
also	would	reduce	political	unrest:	making	clear	that	
the	Recovery	Act	does	not	carve	out	new	exceptions	
to	 foreign	 firms’	 opportunities	 in	 the	U.S.	market	
would	 sharply	 reduce	 concerns,	 and	 rhetoric,	 over	
protectionism—and	so	would	avoid	fueling	the	fires	
of	protectionism	abroad.	Cf. Art	Pine,	“Hurt	Ameri-
can?,” Congress	Daily,	March	 9,	 2009	 (noting	 that	
“Buy	American”	provisions	in	the	Recovery	Act	have	




Regulatory Option: The Specialty Metals 
Model—A	second	approach	would	 be	 to	 adopt	 the	
regulatory	 regime	 normally	 applied	 to	 specialty	
metals	bought	by	the	U.S.	Defense	Department.	See 
U.S.	Department	 of	Defense,	Defense	Procurement	
and	Acquisition	 Policy,	Restrictions on Specialty 
Metals (10 U.S.C. 2533b),	available	at www.acq.osd.
mil/dpap/index.html	(Web	site	chronicles	evolution	
of	 specialty	metals	 restrictions).	Under	 10	USCA	
§	 2533b,	when	DOD	purchases	 certain	major	 cat-
egories	of	items—such	as	aircraft,	missile	and	space	
systems,	ships,	tank	and	automotive	items,	weapon	
systems,	 and	ammunition—only	 items	and	 compo-
nents	containing	domestic	specialty	metals	may	be	
















metals	 regulatory	 regime	 took	years	 to	 implement.	
Delaying	 the	 Recovery	Act’s	 implementation,	 in	
contrast,	 could	be	disastrous.	Second,	 although	 the	
specialty	metals	statute	applies	a	domestic	preference	
to	both	end items and	components,	the	Recovery	Act	
does	not specifically	 state	 that	 its	“Buy	American”	
protections	 should	 be	 extended	 to	 components	 as	
well	as	 the	end	products	actually	purchased	under	


















over domestic U.S. vendors,	were	the	Recovery	Act’s	
“Buy	American”	requirement	to	be	funneled	through	
the	specialty	metals	regime.	
Regulatory Option: The Federal Transit 
Funding Model—A	 final	 option	 is	 found	 in	 the	








































of	 enormous	 complexity.	Under	 the	 federal	 transit	
regulations,	 for	 example,	although	 requirements	 for	
steel	 and	 iron	apply	 to	 all	“construction	materials	
made	primarily	 of	 steel	 or	 iron	 and	used	 in	 infra-













economy,	which	 desperately	 needs	 new	 stimulus	
funds,	simply	cannot	afford.
Conclusion—The	“Buy	American”	requirements	




be	 catastrophic	 in	 the	 current	 economic	 crisis,	 and	






while	 implementing	Congress’	 intent.	The	 optimal	
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